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Abstract 
 
This essay first examines the issue of intersubjectivity in terms of the 
paradigmatic relationship between I  and You. From a grammatical 
standpoint this relationship seems asymmetrical as well as necessarily 
performative: I implies the speech act of the speaker. You exists only as I's 
interlocutor. This helps us understand the very different status of what is 
called the 3rd person--and which would more accurately be called a 
nonperson, as Benveniste explains. This nonperson marks the position of a 
Third Party. I propose to show that the same Third Party--whether a living 
being or a thing--is also involved in the traditional ceremonial gift-exchange 
relationship discussed by Marcel Mauss. The relationship between the 
partners in gift-exchange is mediated by the being or the thing given, which is 
for the recipient a token and substitute of the giver. What this involves is the 
reciprocal public recognition of the partners. In modern societies this function 
is performed by the law and by the institutions of the arbiter-State as they 
emerged in the formation of the Greek city. 
  
Keywords: I/you relationships, performatives, reciprocity, gift-giving, 
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“Who are you?” This question pertains to an entirely 
different model of discourse than the question,  “Who is the 
other?” Why is there such a great difference between them? 
After all, from a grammatical point of view, it only involves a 
shift from the second to the third person. However, this 
apparently trivial shift involves crucial ontological 
implications. The question, “Who is the other?” originates from 
the position of any curious person, or of such eminently – and 
professionally – curious people as judges, researchers, 
historians, police officers, or other professional investigators. 
Questioners stay in the background, foregrounding what is 
being questioned; they keep some distance with their objects; 
they aim to produce a truth that will be recognized and META: Res. in Herm., Phen., and Pract. Philosophy – II (1) / 2010 
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acceptable by peers capable of verifying the rigueur of the 
research procedures that have been followed and of accessing 
documents accessible to any other investigator. This objective 
and verifiable model belongs to what grammarians call “third 
person,” or rather “non-person.” The question, “Who are you?” 
on the contrary, can only be asked by “me.” Of course anyone 
can take on the position of the questioning “I.” The issue lies 
elsewhere. Along with the question, “Who are you?” something 
opens up within language, and this opening up establishes the 
very existence of the addressor and addressee of the question. 
This shift is a strong marker that is found in every language. 
What does it mean? Probably that the “I/You” relationship is a 
relationship of reciprocity, that such a relationship only exists 
as an act, and that it commits the interlocutors through a pact, 
be it an implicit one. What is this pact about? I will try to show 
that it is about the very fact of the existence of an unbreakable 
bond, yet one that binds beings that are separable from each 
other. I am, therefore you are. Yet I am not you. Conversely, 
you are, therefore I am. Yet you are not me. We are only 
together through a decision to form an alliance. From the start, 
this encounter implies the fact that the other also exists. Who 
is the other as a third party? He is everything that is neither 
you nor me and among which we exist. We only exist for each 
other because we exist through the other outside of ourselves, 
or rather the other that stands between us. We have no direct 
access  to each other but we can testify to our reciprocal 
commitment through a third person, this other that is not 
ourselves. This testifying involves not only words but also the 
act through which “I” presents “you” with something – or 
someone – from the world as coming from himself, offers it to 
him as a guarantee and substitute of himself: from me to you 
through the mediation of the thing that is given, and back, a 
thing being given in return, reversing the positions of giver and 
receiver. Human beings only exist through this reciprocal bond 
through the mediation of what is exchanged between them. The 
power of this schema is expressed by language through the 
distinction between grammatical persons and its operation is 
performed through gift-giving relationships that follow rituals 
of exchange. This is what I intend to investigate.  Marcel Hénaff - I/You: Reciprocity, Gift-Giving, and the Third Party  
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Linguistic Approach: the “I/You” Binomial 
versus Non-Person 
 
What can language itself teach us about this? Since 
childhood, which is to say since we have learned to conjugate 
verbs, it seems to go without saying that in every language 
three types of persons exist, the first being ‘I’, the second, ‘You,’ 
and the third, ‘He/She/It.’ We also believe that their 
distribution is relatively universal in spite of the diversity in 
the occasions in which they are used and the large number of 
languages in the world (although classical Indian grammarians 
called the 3rd person the third, and conversely). This is why we 
find it surprising to learn from linguists that this partition into 
three elements is base on an illusion, that only the first two 
persons (‘I’ and ‘You’ in our classification) deserve this name, 
and that what is commonly designated – in our languages – as 
third person is not really a person. It seems that Arab 
grammarians were the ones who had the most accurate 
intuition of what this question involves when they chose to 
designate the first person – ‘I’ – as “the one that speaks,” the 
second as “the one that is addressed, and the third as “the one 
that is absent”; in short, the position of the latter is not 
situated at the same level as that of the two others, as Emile 
Benvéniste noted in several groundbreaking articles 
(Benvéniste 1971, 195-204)1 to which I will refer in order to set 
a first starting point on the question of reciprocity.  
In order to better situate what is at stake in this 
distribution, I will propose that the ontological status of 
grammatical subjects be distinguished from their relational or 
social status.  
Ontological status. Benvéniste noted that a confusion 
developed within the Western tradition between grammatical 
subject and person (we might add that this was probably due to 
reasons related to a metaphysical conception already well-
established in classical Greece). This is why a “third person” 
was promoted by grammar as an extension of the first two. 
This extension is inappropriate.  META: Res. in Herm., Phen., and Pract. Philosophy – II (1) / 2010 
  60 
Let us first consider the I-You binomial. ‘I’ can only be 
uttered by a current speaker:  I refers to the person who is 
speaking at the time when he or she is speaking (be it in 
everyday life, reported speech, or fictional writing). I thus 
refers to oneself. It is from the start an affirmation and 
attestation of existence. It is also an attestation of subjectivity 
that designates this person’s position and act as unique. It is 
me and no one else that is speaking and acting. “The form of I 
has no linguistic existence except in the act of speaking in 
which it is uttered,” (Benvéniste 1971, 218) Benvéniste wrote, 
and he added, “I signifies ‘the person who is uttering the 
present instance of the discourse containing I’.” (Benvéniste 
1971, 218) In other words, speech-act and existence coincide in 
this I. This entails the same statement regarding You, which is 
symmetrically defined as, “the ‘individual spoken to in the 
present instance of discourse containing the linguistic instance 
you’.” (Benvéniste 1971, 218) It is you – and nor other – that I 
am addressing. Moreover, the ‘I-You’ relationship is such that 
the ‘You’ that I am addressing is also an ‘I’ for which I am a 
‘You,’ since even though the ‘I-You’ relationship is from the 
start a relationship of perspective from ‘I’ to ‘You’ it implies the 
reversibility of ‘You’ into ‘I’ for the person which I am 
addressing and which, by definition, can reply to me. In other 
words, a grammatical  person  is and can only be someone 
capable of making this statement and this reply. ‘I’ and ‘You’ 
can only exist through the speech-act. From this various deictic 
words derive, such as ‘here’ and ‘now’; ‘yesterday’ and 
tomorrow.’ They all refer to speech-acts, whereas their ‘third 
person’ counterparts are ‘in the same place’ and ‘at the same 
time; ‘the day before’ and ‘the day after.’ I and You exclusively 
belong to the present of the speech-act, which is, according to 
linguists, what confers upon them the status of persons. This is 
how linguistic analysis opens onto pragmatics, i.e. an analysis 
of speech-acts [pragmata].  
This is not the case of ‘He/She/It,’ which is a grammatical 
subject but not a “third person”; the third party position of this 
grammatical subject designates not just any person absent 
from the ‘I-You’ relationship but also non-persons such as 
animals and things. As Benvéniste showed, this is very clearly Marcel Hénaff - I/You: Reciprocity, Gift-Giving, and the Third Party  
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marked in many languages by the absence of an ending or, on 
the contraire as in English by the addition of an ending [I do; 
you do VS he/she does]. This does not involve a 
depersonalization but merely a positive marker indicating the 
absence of a person. It makes it possible to recognize whether 
or not an agent is present. Thus, the Latin phrase, volat avis, 
should not be translated as, the bird is flying, but, literally, as, 
it is flying, the bird. Benvéniste notes that this third form can 
contaminate everything outside of I  and even affects You, 
sometimes assigning it a value that lies outside of the I-You 
binomial, as in cases when You stands for One in generalizing 
statements such as, If you wish for peace, prepare for war. This 
impersonal use of You is observed in many languages. In the 
same way, the so-called “third person” can take on analogical 
values beyond its normal range, which can be completely 
diametrical opposites: it can indicate that the speaker situates 
the addressee above interpersonal relationships in order to 
mark respect for his or her status, as in the Italian expression 
of courtesy Lei (She)  or the French use of He or She to 
designate oneself (as when a monarch proclaims, The King 
wishes that...; he… etc); but the same form can on the contrary 
express extreme contempt when, instead of using the second 
person, one states in front of an addressee, “Qu’est-ce qu’il me 
veut, celui-là? (”What’s the matter with him?”).  
Relational Status. These markers make it possible to better 
identify the specific type of I-You relationship involved and to 
foreground the referential character or perspective of I.  I 
always identifies the speaker and You the addressee. You only 
exists for an I that signals and asserts its position of 
subjectivity par excellence, as Benvéniste summarized, “One 
could thus define “you” as the non-subjective person, in contrast 
to the subjective person that “I” represents; and these two 
“persons” are together opposed to the “non-person” form (= he).” 
(Benvéniste 1971, 201) From this point of view plural forms are 
interesting: We does not consist of the addition of several Is, 
Benvéniste said, but of an “amplified I,” i.e. a speaker that 
takes on the position of subjectivity on behalf of a group of 
persons, whether it is the inclusive I + You or the exclusive I + 
Them category. This echo of this “amplified I” is clearly in META: Res. in Herm., Phen., and Pract. Philosophy – II (1) / 2010 
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evidence in the royal We used by princes and the rhetorical We 
used by author as well as in the less common We that refers to 
a community of persons that constitute a single entity, as in the 
famous “We the people” in the United States Declaration of 
Independence. Following the same logic, in French Tu turned 
into Vous as a polite form and in English You came to replace 
Thou, which then disappeared from colloquial speech. Finally, 
the boundary between I-You and We-You on one side and He-
She-It on the other remains clear: grammatically, the latter 
category is that of the non-person; thus They is equivalent to 
One as in the Latin dicunt and the English They say.  
The nature of the I-You pair must nevertheless be 
considered in more depth and its unique relational status more 
precisely identified. Stating that I is a speech-act that 
necessarily implies You as addressee means that I-You 
constitutes an indivisible entity. These two persons are tied 
along a model of integral reciprocity, since You is implicitly 
reversed into I in his or her reply, conversely turning the 
original  I into You. Saying I therefore amounts to accepting 
from the start this inversion of subjectivities. “Consciousness of 
self is only possible if it is experienced by contrast. I use I only 
when I am speaking to someone who will be a you in my 
address. It is this condition of dialogue that is constitutive of 
person, for it implies that reciprocally I becomes you in the 
address of the one who in his turn designates himself as I.” 
(Benvéniste 1971, 224-5) Let us add that (as we shall later see) 
any strong reciprocity presupposes a response relationship, an 
alternation of the positions in speech an action, therefore an 
unpredictable successiveness and hence an open temporality, 
which constitutes the very evidence of the speakers’ freedom. 
This makes it possible to better understand another 
remarkable statement of Benvéniste according to which in the 
speech-act the whole of language as system is taken on by the 
speaker and thus subjectivized as speech addressed to another 
person2. 
At this point it is especially interesting to note the 
exemplary status of a particular form of speech-act that was 
first described by J. Austin (Austin 1975) and later examined 
again by J. Searle (Searle 1969) and others who called it Marcel Hénaff - I/You: Reciprocity, Gift-Giving, and the Third Party  
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“performative.” Performatives are first-person statements that 
only involve certain verbs and in which the very fact of stating 
performs the action the statement designates. The best 
examples of this are statements such as “I swear,” “I promise,” 
or “I commit myself to.” They provide the fullest expression of 
the function of I, which is to testify to the being of the speaker. 
Testifying means bearing witness as the very person that is 
committed in and by what he or she is stating. Toward who is 
the speaker committed? This has to be toward the You that is 
involved in the speech exchange, whether an individual or a 
group. In performative statements, the grammatical 
relationship is transcended into a social or rather a political 
bond: the I-You binomial becomes a pact in which the collective 
structure of language comes to the fore along with the implicit 
convention that characterizes society as an accepted alliance 
between subjects capable of making a choice. “We the people” 
once again provides a perfect example of this. We can thus 
understand that performative statements take us toward a 
field of experience in which speech-act and social act overlap. 
This privileged locus requires a more precise examination. It is 
the locus of practices of reciprocal commitment and 
relationships of public and solemn exchanges. Anthropology 
provides us with a particularly important and well-researched 
example of this: namely, the exchanges of ceremonial gifts. This 
deserves further discussion for two reasons: first, they express 
the relationship of reciprocity in an exceptionally strong way, 
in which the relationship between Self and others takes on a 
founding character; second, this type of exchange forces us to 
rethink in depth the role of the third party, namely what is 
called the third person in the I-You relationship: to speak of a 
“non-person,” as Benvéniste did, obviously does not mean that 
humans are not persons outside of the I-You relationship. It 
may even be the case that this relationship can only occur 
through this third party, which is absent from the dialog and 
yet without which the speech exchange that seems to ignore 
him could not take place. 
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Anthropological Approach:  
Ceremonial Gift, Alliance, and  Reciprocity  
  
What does it mean to talk of a third party? The third party 
can be discussed in several different ways, as being can be 
according to Aristotle. I will not deal with the questions of the 
third man Plato discussed in Parmenides, of the excluded 
middle in logical reasoning, or of Quine’s impossible third text, 
regarding translation. I will restrict my discussion to the 
question of the third as mediator between two terms in a 
relationship. Yet even in this case the third party can be 
considered in different ways depending on whether it 
designates a thing (as guarantee), a person (as witness or 
judge), or in a more abstract way a code or text recognized as 
having normative or even constraining power (such as a law or 
set of laws). Do these different aspects constitute separate 
categories or are they articulated together as part of the figure 
of the mediating third party? I will try to show that such an 
articulation does exist and can be best deciphered in the case of 
gift-giving. However, this deciphering can only occur if we 
understand that gift-giving itself cannot be reduced to a single 
phenomenon but includes at least three, which constitute 
something akin to the different realms discussed by Pascal. 
Presenting in a very general way an articulation between gift-
giving, third party, and law thus runs the risk of giving free 
rein to empty speculations. We must first attempt to precisely 
define the kind of gift-giving that is involved in order to try to 
ensure that the two other concepts will be applied to specific 
fields of reference.   
 
The Three Categories of Gift-Giving 
 
When we reflect upon what it means to giv,e we believe that 
we can agree on a broad definition that applies to every case 
and could be stated as follows: giving is providing a good or 
service in a non self-interested manner, which means that no 
reciprocation is guaranteed or expected. This definition seems 
perfectly reasonable, yet applying it to every form of gift-giving 
can lead to the most serious confusions since ritual gift-giving Marcel Hénaff - I/You: Reciprocity, Gift-Giving, and the Third Party  
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precisely includes the strict obligation to reciprocate the gift. 
We must therefore acknowledge that the character of oblation 
that is at the core of this definition is not relevant in this case. 
The solution that has generally been chosen to confront this 
problem has been to dismiss ritual gift-giving from the scope of 
this definition by calling it “archaic” and suspecting that the 
requirement of reciprocity involves the expectation of an 
advantage (or interest) that would be the damning evidence for 
this archaic character. This approach already performs a 
discrimination between “true” gift-giving (which is supposed to 
have a character of oblation and be unconditional) and its 
impure instantiations that can be identified by their difference 
with the definition3. In contrast to this approach, one could 
resort to casuistic considerations on the amphibology of the 
word “interest” in order to associate it in a paradoxical way 
with the word “gift,” so as to preserve this “old-fashioned” 
notion of gift-giving. In my opinion, recognizing that several 
models of gift-giving exist and that they are significantly 
different from each other provides a more promising approach 
than claiming to force a single mould onto overly diverse 
practices.  
An effort of clarification is required. Let us start with a few 
convincing examples. It is hard to see how the following could 
be placed under the same label: a. the festivals and gifts that 
chiefs offer each other in turn in traditional societies; b. the 
celebrations and presents that parents give to their children on 
the occasion of their birthdays or that anyone offers to loved 
ones in order to give them happiness; c. the donations given to 
populations on the occasion of catastrophes. These examples 
are significant: it can be considered that they exemplify three 
main types of gift-giving: a. the first is generally called 
“archaic,” a concept heavily loaded with presuppositions; I 
prefer to keep to descriptive criteria and call it ceremonial gift-
giving; it is always described as public and reciprocal; b. 
gracious or oblatory gift-giving, which may or may not be 
private but it is primarily unilateral.  c.  mutual aid giving, 
pertaining to either social solidarity or so-called philanthropic 
activity; it is viewed by some as constituting the modern form 
of traditional gift-giving.  META: Res. in Herm., Phen., and Pract. Philosophy – II (1) / 2010 
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When a concept – such as that of gift-giving – applies to 
such different practices and is open to such divergent 
argumentations, there is reason to believe that its definition is 
imprecise or even confused and that the practices involved have 
not been sufficiently described and categorized. Thus it is likely 
that the three examples given above do not constitute a 
homogeneous class of objects. The first type is characterized by 
the obligation to reciprocate the gift that has been received, as 
shown by ethnographic  investigations; it therefore raises the 
issue of reciprocity (which is certainly much more than a mere 
exchange of good manners). Its lexical field is that of 
dosis/anti-dosis in Greek in which anti always indicates the 
action in return that is called for by the initial action.  
The second type reveals a spontaneous generosity towards 
those close to the giver, which is viewed above all as a 
psychological or moral quality. Its lexical field is that of kharis 
in Greek (one of the primary meanings of which is “joy”), that of 
unilateral giving (there is no such thing as anti-kharis); this 
recalls the whole of the theoretical field of Biblical Grace (hen, 
favor translated as kharis in the Septante, a term also used by 
Paul), of the Latin concept of gratia from Seneca to Augustine, 
and of Medieval through Reformation theologies.  
The third type – as opposed to the second – expresses a 
much more social dimension of generosity toward either close 
associates (friends or neighbors, between which reciprocity is 
desirable but not mandatory) or strangers (case in which 
returning a gift would not make sense): this would be the field 
of the philia or philanthropia discussed by Aristotle in 
Nichomachean Ethics. It also encompasses various practices of 
solidarity between close associates or members of a chosen 
community (such as a religious congregation or a group of 
friends) and everything Weber described as pertaining to a 
“religious ethic of brotherhood” [die religiöse Ethik der 
Brüderlichkeit]” (Weber 1993)4.  
At this point a crucial question must be dealt with: whereas 
forms of gift-giving pertaining cases 2. and 3. are still common 
practice to this day, it is clear that ceremonial gift-giving as a 
public form of exchange of presents between groups no longer 
constitutes a predominant fact in modern societies. From this Marcel Hénaff - I/You: Reciprocity, Gift-Giving, and the Third Party  
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point of view gift-giving is a phenomenon of the past that 
barely survives in the form of official gifts. This seems to 
legitimize the use of the term archaic  and to explain the 
temptation to identify traces of this in the two other forms of 
gift-giving that are still occurring. I had the opportunity to 
show in another work (see Hénaff 2002 / 2009 / 2010) that an 
entirely different approach of ceremonial exchanges is possible 
– and perhaps required; it amounts to understanding them 
above all as exchanges not of goods but of symbols, more 
precisely as a public procedure of reciprocal recognition between 
human groups. This reading (the central elements of which I 
will now sum up) provides a starting point making it possible to 
show that in any society that endows itself with a central 
organizing authority – such as a city-state and a kingdom, in 
short every entity that we now call a state – this public 
recognition  is ensured by law  and the whole of civic 
institutions. This transformation makes it possible to articulate 
traditional gift-giving, the law (as nomos), and the third party 
which remains to be defined as part of this trinomial.  
 
Ceremonial Gift-Giving as a Pact of Recognition 
 
We must reexamine the question of ceremonial gift-giving. 
M. Mauss’ The Gift (Mauss 2000) provides us with an 
appropriate starting point. Mauss was not the first to show 
interest in this type of social phenomenon, which he too called 
“archaic,” but he was the first who epistemologically articulated 
this question. Without dwelling on this book which is probably 
familiar to most of us, I would like to very briefly mention his 
main conclusions along with a few questions. 1. Mauss defined 
procedures of gift exchanges as “a total social phenomena,” 
which meant that they encompass every dimension of collective 
life such as religion, politics, economy, ethics, and aesthetics, 
and above all that they constitute the central fact around which 
everything else is organized; hence this question: what has 
become of such central facts in modern societies? Either they 
have disappeared or their purpose has survived in different 
forms; if so, what are these forms? 2. Mauss showed that gift-
giving procedures consist of three inseparable and mandatory META: Res. in Herm., Phen., and Pract. Philosophy – II (1) / 2010 
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steps: giving, accepting, and returning the gift. To him this 
mandatory character appeared as the most enigmatic. He 
documented it but did not explain it; is it possible to present a 
convincing interpretation of this obligation? 3. Mauss was 
clearly aware that this exchange in no way amounts to trade: 
he even noted that the well-known kula circuit of exchange of 
the Trobriand Islands, in which precious goods are offered by 
both partners, coexists with a profitable exchange called 
gimwali, which is regarded as the opposite of kula  and 
conducted with entirely different partners. Gift exchanges and 
commercial exchanges coexist and belong to two very different 
realms; how can we understand that the mandatory response to 
the gift that was received is not motivated by self-interest? 4. 
The last important character Mauss emphasized was that what 
is given through this exchange of precious goods is always 
oneself; what is literally handed over to the other through the 
good that is offered is the self of the giver; hence the magic that 
protects it. What does the presence of the giver in the thing 
that is given imply? Is this a superstition that should be 
ignored or the revelation of a relationship that is specific to the 
third party constituted by the thing that is offered and absent 
from the thing that is sold?  
  It is clear that ceremonial gift-giving raises a set of 
questions that are specific to it and radically distinguish it from 
the two other forms of gift-giving. Since it is impossible to 
discuss within the limited framework of this presentation the 
now considerable empirical collection of materials that has 
been gathered for almost a century, I will just present a critical 
assessment indicating seven variables that can be drawn from 
field investigations and that make it possible to better identify 
the specificity of ceremonial  gift-giving: 1. goods exchanged: 
precious objects (or beings); festive foods; 2. procedures: well-
established rituals accepted  by the partners; 3. level of 
communication: public; 4. effects caused or expected: a. strong 
bonds between givers and receivers; b. prestige and rank 
gained; 5. type of choice: mandatory; 6. mode of relationship: 
reciprocal; 7. attitude of exchange: generous rivalry. 
Let us note that the two other types of gift-giving (type II, 
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only share one or two of these variables with ceremonial gift-
giving. It is therefore clear that discussing “gift-giving” in 
general entails a serious epistemological risk. Gift-giving 
cannot be discussed without qualifying it with the adjective 
that specifies the realm in which it is practiced. This clearly 
forces us to divide what has been called “the gift paradigm” into 
three parts or, better, to acknowledge that there are at least 
three paradigms rather than a single one. They can be 
described as different realms in Pascal’s sense: each of them 
has its own system of justification. Thus reciprocity, which is 
essential to ceremonial gift-giving, is not relevant to gracious 
gift-giving but may or may not be valued within solidarity-
based gift-giving. Similarly, discretion – self-effacement of the 
giver – which is often expected (and sometimes indispensable) 
in gracious gift-giving would make no sense in ceremonial gift-
giving, which is public by definition. We will focus on 
ceremonial gift-giving in order to understand the relationship 
between gift-giving, third party, and the law. We can therefore 
expect that this third party involves the public realm and that 
the law must be understood in its institutional sense.  
We must then present an entirely different interpretation of 
ceremonial gift-giving, one that breaks even with Mauss’. I 
already mentioned above the central argument of my 
hypothesis: ceremonial gift-giving is primarily a procedure of 
public and reciprocal recognition between groups within 
traditional societies. It still remains to determine what this 
recognition means and why it occurs through such a procedure. 
I will only indicate this fairly briefly in order to avoid repeating 
a demonstration that I have already presented (Hénaff 2002). A 
central lesson is provided by investigations concerning first 
encounters. Numerous testimonies have taught us that these 
encounters primarily take the form of reciprocal exchanges of 
presents: the opening gifts. This may seem sensible and 
courteous to us. Our surprise arises once these exchanges are 
presented as mandatory – the alternative being conflict5 –   
whereas we realize that polite phrases and friendly attitudes 
nowadays seem sufficient for us. The whole question lies in 
these two observations. Nothing can better help us understand 
what is at stake than a short narrative that was reported by a META: Res. in Herm., Phen., and Pract. Philosophy – II (1) / 2010 
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British anthropologist (Strathern 1971, XII) who had heard it 
from his New Guinean informer; during the 1920s, the latter 
had witnessed the arrival of the first white man to his village. 
It so happens that, according to local legends, the dead could 
return as light-skinned cannibalistic ghosts. It was decided 
that a test would be performed to determine whether or not 
this potentially dangerous stranger was a human being. They 
offered him some pigs and the white man, who was a well-
informed Australian administrator, offered them 
precious  shells in return. Then, the informer concluded, “We 
decided that he was a human like us.”6   
  It seems to me that this story can be viewed as an 
exemplary parable that can help us understand the most 
general meaning of reciprocal, public, and ceremonial gift-
giving, as well as its essential relationship with the 
phenomenon of recognition. The opening gifts ritual is a 
procedure of reciprocal recognition in the triple sense of 
identifying,  accepting, and finally honoring others. A first 
question must be raised at this point: why does this recognition 
have to occur through exchanged goods? Other questions arise: 
what is it that is recognized in the other? What is made 
possible by this recognition? 
In order to answer these questions – and to increase our 
surprise – it seems to me that we have to move to an entirely 
different field and wonder whether or not other animal 
societies, starting with those closest to us (apes), exhibit 
behaviors comparable to these. What the most advanced 
research on this shows us, especially regarding chimpanzees 
(Goodall 1986; de Waal 1989; McGrew 1992), is that, 1. mutual 
recognition as identification occurs through vocal messages, 
smells, and above all coordinated sets of gestures and attitudes; 
2. recognition as acceptance takes place through postures and 
procedures of reciprocity (such as attitudes of appeasement, 
mutual grooming, and sharing of space), but never through 
objects given as tokens and kept in exchange for others that are 
given either immediately or later (which has nothing to do with 
the sharing of food among various mammals (Stanford 2001) or 
with the mating rituals of certain birds, reptiles, and insects). 
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a fair and deliberate exchange of one bone for another with 
another dog” (Smith 1993, 21). It seems that humans alone 
resort to the procedure consisting of committing oneself by 
giving something of oneself as a token and substitute of oneself. 
The fact that an agent vouches for himself in front of other 
agents for the duration of a time period can be provisionally 
considered as defining him as a Self. It is remarkable that this 
occurs through the mediation of a thing, a third element that 
constitutes a token of oneself. This recalls the classical Greek 
and Roman procedure of the pact performed through a sym-
bolon (derived from ballein: to put; and syn: together), a piece of 
pottery broken in two, of which each partner would keep one 
half that could fit the other as witness for the future that an 
agreement had been made. According to this model7, reciprocal 
gift-giving is nothing else than the originating gesture of 
reciprocal recognition between humans, a gesture that is found 
in no other living beings in that it is mediated by a thing, but a 
thing that comes from oneself, stands for oneself, and bears 
witness to the commitment that was made. Forming an 
alliance – a pact – means bringing together one’s own self and 
the strangeness of the other through a thing that comes from 
oneself and is desirable by the other. This third party brings 
the two sides together: there is no alliance without an Ark of 
the Covenant. The thing given binds the two parties primarily 
by bearing witness that the bond has been accepted. This 
reciprocal recognition through the exchange of something that 
specifically belongs to the group (or its representative) and is 
offered to the other, is at the core of the exogamic relationship 
(according to Lévi-Strauss 1969, 552), the wife who goes to the 
other group is “the gift par excellence”) and illuminates the 
prohibition of incest, which is above all a positive imperative of 
reciprocity: one is a human being to the extent that one moves 
outside of the “natural” group based on consanguinity by 
recognizing and forming an alliance with the other. In order to 
be oneself, one must recognize what one is not.  
This is in short the new anthropological interpretation of 
ceremonial gift-giving that I am presenting; it obviously does 
not apply to the two other models of gift-giving, namely 
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Before we can go forward we must understand how the 
concepts of symbol, convention, and alliance are interconnected. 
We will then consider the connection between the concepts of 
reciprocity and obligation.  
  To say that there is an alliance – and in particular an 
exogamic alliance – means that there is a pact and therefore an 
intentional recognition between “Us” and “You” beyond a mere 
social self-regulation among groups. To say that this alliance 
brings together what is not together – performs a sym-ballein – 
and belongs to the realm of intentionality means that the 
encounter between two autonomous beings involves a decision 
to give oneself rules: establishing a convention amounts to 
committing to these rules (which is one of the primary purposes 
of rituals) and involving oneself: giving oneself through the 
thing that guarantees the pact. This is made clear by the 
definition presented by Ortigues, “In general, symbols are the 
materials with which language conventions, social pacts, and 
guarantees of mutual recognition between liberties are 
constituted. Symbols are formative elements of a language, 
considered relative to each other as constituting a system of 
communication or alliance and a law of reciprocity between 
subjects.” (Ortigues 1962, 61) What has been concluded 
through the opening gifts is extended through time by 
relationships that rituals aim at stabilizing; but this is above 
all accomplished through the exogamic alliance, which indexes 
the agreement between groups on the reproduction of life itself 
and connects it to the succession of generations (which is 
particularly obvious in the so-called generalized exchange, in 
which the response occurs over the long term and through 
extended networks). From the moment the exchange of gifts as 
a gesture of alliance occurs, it generates human groups that are 
regulated by a convention.  
In order to better understand this, it may be useful to refer 
to the triadic relation theory that was proposed by Peirce, for 
whom any relationship that implies two agents and an object of 
exchange presupposes a norm of exchange; it is therefore not 
the mere addition of two separable gestures such as, A gives 
object O to B and B receives O from A; from the start and by 
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words, in relationship under a law (Peirce 1931-1958, T. 
I. paragr. 471; Vol. VIII, ch. 8). Descombes (Descombes 1996, 
chap. 18) was right to note that, contrary to Russell’s claim – 
which reduced all exchanges to two dyadic  gestures, A gives 
O  and B receives O – the gift-giving relationship is not the 
transfer of a good from one partner to another but, as Peirce 
explained, a relationship between the partners through the 
mediation of this good. To give is always to give something to 
someone; this relation is inherent in all so-called trivalent 
verbs (such as to give, grant, provide, bring, deliver, etc.). 
However, we must go further: ceremonial gift-giving cannot be 
reduced to giving something to someone as Descombes seems to 
believe; to give a good to someone in accordance with some 
rules instead defines the contractual relationship (let us recall 
that to sell is also a trivalent verb). The gesture of giving – 
especially ceremonial gift-giving – does generate a relationship 
ruled by a law; but from the start it is much more and performs 
much more: it is an commitment under a law. It consists of 
giving oneself  to someone through the mediation of something. 
In this case the third party represents the Self of the giver 
(Mauss was right to emphasize this point) as a token and 
substitute of himself. In the case of ceremonial gift-giving we 
must therefore consider a second level of triadic relationship. 
There is a shift from the neutral fact of convention – the triadic 
structure – to the personal gesture of commitment. However, 
this is not enough: a third level of this relationship must now 
be considered, since the commitment that ceremonial gift-
giving calls for requires a response from the other, i.e. the 
obligation of the gesture in return: therefore, what is involved 
is necessarily a gesture of reciprocity under a law. This law is 
the obligation to return the gift. This is what Mauss found 
surprising; he reported and documented it but admitted he had 
no way of explaining it. Introducing the notion of interest in 
order to account for this reciprocity amounts to a serious 
misunderstanding. What is the meaning of the obligation to 
respond  in ceremonial gift-giving? It is neither a physical 
necessity to react (as in the case of living organisms responding 
to external stimuli) nor a truly legal obligation (which would 
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abided by) or a moral requirement (in the sense that it would 
be immoral not to respond). What we are dealing with is the 
structure of a game and an alternation principle analogous to 
that found in any game between partners and even more 
precisely in a duel. Entering the game entails having to reply 
(as is the case in any exchange of salutations) (Goffman 1961). 
Not responding amounts to taking oneself out of the game. The 
obligation to respond lies in this. One does not throw the ball 
back in order to be generous or courteous or out of a contractual 
obligation but because the response is part of the game, or 
rather of the system of accepted rules. The inseparable 
character of the three terms of the triad concerns not only the 
relationship between the partners but also their reciprocal 
action. The interplay of gift and counter-gift is a gesture of 
reply that precisely matches the alternation of blows (in fact, 
the same partners involved in the exchange of gifts are also 
responsible for vindicatory justice in case an offense was 
committed). This involves neither moral choice nor altruism or 
charity, but only the requirement to reply  that is specific to 
action among the living. The relationship is agonistic from the 
start. But there is more to this: the “game” is at the same time 
the pact that is offered and accepted through the goods 
exchanged9.  
I propose to call this fundamental relationship of 
recognition political because it is radically different from the 
social bond that exists in every animal society. The alliance as 
an explicit gesture of acceptance through the choice of a token-
symbol is only in evidence in human reciprocal ceremonial gift-
giving; from the start it amounts to a public recognition of the 
other group and a commitment to coexist and collaborate, in 
short to a convention; this is precisely what Aristotle called a 
politeia. The alliance takes up and encompasses the social bond 
but also transcends it by turning it into a political bond, which 
is to say an intentional relationship of association. This is the 
relationship that is unique to the human animal; he is the zoon 
politikon in that through the procedure of recognition he 
institutes a life under rules. The uniquely human bond is 
political in that it is the unique bond between autonomous 
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necessarily in an explicit manner). It is therefore clear that an 
essential articulation exists between human order as reciprocal 
public recognition and specifically political instituted order; as 
an institutional procedure between groups, ceremonial gift-
giving between participants in an alliance constitutes the very 
emergence of a public order – though not necessarily its 
permanent historical form. This is what remains to be 
explained. 
 
Polis, Meson, and Nomos  
 
A first question immediately arises: how is this public 
reciprocal recognition, which is performed in traditional 
societies through ritual exchanges of gifts, expressed in 
societies with a central state system? The only possible answer 
seems to me to be that this recognition is affirmed and 
guaranteed by law and by the whole of the political and legal 
institutions. The true heritage of ceremonial gift-giving will 
thus not be found in the realm of the distribution or exchange 
of goods but in that of rights and of the struggles involving 
these rights. It is for historical anthropology to show how this 
transformation occurred. This cannot be demonstrated in detail 
in this presentation. However, we must recall that the 
ceremonial exchanges discussed above concern societies in 
which the forms of authority are generally identified with the 
statuses defined by kinship systems. For this very reason, 
public relationships between groups primarily occur through 
matrimonial alliances. But from the moment an evolution 
develops that leads to the emergence of a power entity that 
transcends kinship groups, something radically changes (this 
shift and the crisis that comes with it are expressed in Greek 
tragedy, in particular Aeschylus’ Oresteia). Individuals now 
appear as members of a larger group – such as the city-state or 
what we now call the state – while still remaining members of 
lineages or clans for a long time to come. But the new identity 
takes precedence over the old (generating a crisis that is in 
evidence in Sophocles’ Antigone). What is new is the equal 
status – isonomia – shared by everyone under the law – nomos. 
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between chiefs are cancelled in favor of a public recognition 
that is identically granted to all. Thus in the Iliad, when 
Achilles, furious at having been despoiled of his share of booty, 
has succeeded in having Agamemnon return it to him, he 
refuses to have it directly handed to him by the Achaean king; 
he demands that the goods be placed in the middle – en to 
meson – so that they will come from the whole community of 
the Greeks, the polis. However, the term nomos was very rarely 
found in Homer; it became frequent in Aeschylus, Pindar, and 
Heraclites, and central in Plato10 and Aristotle. 
But what is the meaning of the affirmation of the nomos, 
the law? This concept can also be understood in many different 
ways. Nowadays it can just as well designate regularities in the 
physical as in the social world, standards of morality, legal 
codes, or divine commandments. We cannot engage in this 
debate now. I will exclusively refer to the law as it is 
understood in its most common institutional sense: as a 
disposition decreed by a sovereign authority that defines norms 
of action that are public and constraining for all members of a 
political community.  
In this sense the Greek word for law is nomos. This term 
calls for questioning. Philological investigation (Benvéniste 
1973; Chantraine 1974; Vernant 1983; Scheid-Tissinier 1994; de 
Romilly  1971) shows that in archaic Greece nomos first 
designated the space where herds grazed and then the plot of 
land assigned to each person for cultivation. This ancient 
meaning is the one that Carl Schmitt affirmed in his The 
Nomos of the Earth (Schmitt 2003); he intended to reinstate it 
in order to challenge later interpretations – above all 19th 
century ones – that turned the law into a strictly formal 
concept. He claimed that this was even the case of the concept 
of Gesetz, which was such a rich one but had been reduced to a 
kind of strictly legal abstraction. Schmitt cleverly warded off 
the risk of any primitivistic regression or naive nostalgia. His 
interest in the earliest meaning of nomos was above all an 
effort to rethink modern law (particularly territorial 
relationships between nations) by basing it on a renewed 
anthropological foundation. But from the start this project was 
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had to do with the hypothesis according to which the evolution 
of the concept of nomos toward an abstraction resulted from a 
kind of negligence and a failure to preserve its original 
meaning. This amounted to deploring the fact that archaic 
Greece became classical Greece; or, in more descriptive terms, 
that modes of living and of social organization that were 
originally associated with pastoral life and farming evolved 
toward a society dominated by the formation of cities. In fact, 
this had already started to happen in pre-classical Greece; 
Schmitt did acknowledge that the ancient meaning of nomos 
was already disappearing by the time of Solon (end of the 6th 
century). But above all Schmitt considered that the oldest 
meaning of nomos was that of distribution and measurement of 
cultivated space. This was inaccurate. Nomos originally 
designated the grazing space that moved along with the herd; 
hence the term “nomad.” At the same time, the term nomos 
involved the conventions and uses that were associated with 
these movements. Its legal aspect is therefore as old as its 
territorial aspect. Identifying nomos with the idea of norm from 
Solon to Plato is therefore consistent. We now come to a second 
limitation of Schmitt’s analysis; he did not question why this 
evolution occurred. He regretted and even challenged it. An 
additional enquiry was required. How is it that nomos came to 
be understood as rule of law? To be able to answer this question 
we must understand – following the hypothesis stated above – 
how  the public reciprocal recognition that was generated by 
ceremonial exchanges of gifts in traditional societies is ensured 
by law in societies that are organized based on the state model. 
From this point of view the case of Greece is exemplary, since 
this shift is inseparable from the very emergence of the polis.  
We therefore need to reexamine the question of the meson, 
this middle space that is precisely affirmed as a new figure of 
the third party, doing away with the direct interaction between 
private groups – lineages, gené  – and imposing the law as 
arbiter between individuals who are now equal members of the 
city. Historical research (Detienne  1996; Levêque & Vidal-
Naquet  1996; Vernant  1981; Finley  1981; Finley  2002) has 
shown that what would later constitute the invention of the 
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the 7th century BCE. The “hoplitic reform,” which gave equal 
rights to all warriors by eliminating clan and social differences 
between them and retaining their identity of destiny in facing 
death as the only criterion, gave rise to the decision-making 
assembly held around the meson, the empty center where the 
booty was placed in order to be shared in an equitable manner 
and where everyone had to stand in order to only present what 
he considered to be the collective interest to the others who sat 
in a circle. It is this model of a public space that would set the 
development of the city with its agora, Common Hearth, 
temples, stadiums, theaters, and above all the locus of political 
deliberation where the laws that ruled over the life of the 
community and under which every citizen would be recognized 
in front of all others would be formulated and proclaimed: all 
are equal under the laws. Along with the emergence of the city 
and from this empty center, the law as arbiter was proclaimed 
and the heroic reciprocity of lineages confronting each other in 
the agôn came to lose its legitimacy. Justice by arbitration was 
substituted for the vindicatory justice that characterized 
ceremonial gift-giving relationships. Debates were ruled by the 
histor – judge, investigator, and mediator: a new figure of the 
third party. A different history was beginning. From then on 
every democratic transformation would take place under the 
sign of the law and the third party as arbiter and against all 
forms of reciprocal allegiance (such as feudal relationships).  
The realm of reciprocity can still rule collective games, 
conflictual relationships between dueling groups (such as 
White Rose versus Red Rose; Guelfs versus Ghibellines; 
Bolsheviks against Mensheviks), and wars between nations. It 
is the locus of passions. It also remains the locus of 
interpersonal relationships; I-You; the sparring of love; the 
game of life.  
 
As a conclusion: Reciprocity, Mutuality,  
and Third Party as Arbiter 
 
In the same way as the I-You relationship in speech 
(Jacques  1985), the ceremonial gift-giving relationship takes 
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relationship. In the same way as the exchange of words in a 
debate already amounts to the acceptance of a procedure of 
mediation, the exchange of gifts amounts to the avoidance of an 
exchange of blows. Ceremonial gift-giving is not a state of 
peace; it is a controlled conflict. Words bring about the thing 
that is talked about, namely It/That or the world that 
intervenes as a third party in the encounter between I and You. 
Even if I and You are talking about each other, what they are 
saying moves through the phenomenon of their reciprocal 
presence and toward the thing that is the object of their 
discourse. In order for them to speak to each other, a world 
must exist, i.e. this to which they are not speaking but about 
which they are speaking. What is involved outside of the I-You 
relationship is what supports the relationship of dialog within 
speech. The world always preexists speakers and addressees; it 
is what is given prior to any reciprocity (once again, this is the 
level at which the original donation without a donor – that of 
being – would be situated).  
There is therefore no need to choose between agôn and 
irené.  Agôn occurs right along I and You when two entities 
alien to each other come in contact and can only exist through 
affirming their unique being. The space of the speech exchange 
is necessarily agonistic. From the outset it involves the 
requirement for one to be recognized by the other.  From the 
outset this is a reciprocal requirement, which presupposes that 
what is requested must also be offered. This is the Golden Rule. 
This requirement is present in language. Words bring the 
world into the relationship and institute it between I and You. 
By the same logic, the ceremonial exchange entrusts the other 
with something from the world as a token of oneself. In both 
cases a pact is established or renewed that wards off the 
conflict between two entities alien to each other. Agôn does not 
primarily mean violence but a requirement to affirm the 
autonomy of the Self in front of that of the other. The self of 
each person exposes itself to the other but does so in and 
through a third party that binds them together and brings each 
one to the other.  
If the world intervenes as a third party between the 
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between the objectivity of the world and the impartiality of the 
law becomes apparent, as does that between the peace given by 
things and the peace among humans that is gained by giving 
oneself to the other through things. The dialog between persons 
necessarily takes place through the exchange of what is the 
non-person. Persons come to an agreement and recognize each 
other through what stands outside of them in an autonomous 
manner. The thing given is the common witness to the 
encounter between the protagonists. But from the moment the 
relationship ceases to connect two persons alone, from the 
moment something collective is involved and all the members of 
the community, surrounding the empty center – the meson –, 
become equal to each other, then agonistic reciprocity is 
replaced by contractual mutuality; each comes to an agreement 
with the other under the law that is placed in the middle and 
operates as an arbiter. This is the res publica par excellence. 
This is the very function that Rousseau assigned to it: “To obey 
the law rather than men,” he said. Such was also the polis 
according to Plutarch: logou kai nomou metabole; a 
transmutation operated by speech and the law. This is also how 
all public dialogs and all intellectual communities – such as 
ours – exist around a Third Party that is no one. 
 
 
NOTES 
 
 
1 This discussion continues in “The Nature of Pronouns” [1956] (Benvéniste 1971, ch. 
20), and in “Subjectivity in Language” [1963] (Benvéniste 1971, ch. 21). 
2 “Language is so organized that it permits each speaker to appropriate to himself an 
entire language by designating himself as I.” (Benvéniste 1971, 226) 
3 This was the approach chosen by J. Derrida in Given Time (Derrida 1992), at least 
regarding his reading of Mauss; I will not discuss the other central aspects of his analysis 
in this paper. 
4 Orig. “Zwischenbetrachtung. Stufen und Richtungen der religiösen Weltablehnung”, 
1915. 
5 Mauss clearly stated this: “Over a considerable period of time and in a considerable 
number of societies, men approached one another in a curious frame of mind, one of fear 
and exaggerated hostility, and of generosity that was likewise exaggerated, but such traits 
only appear insane to our eyes (...) there is no middle way: one trusts completely, or one 
mistrusts completely; one lays down one’s arms and gives up magic, or one gives 
everything.” (Mauss 2000, 81) 
6 “He gave us shell valuables in return for pigs, and we decided he was a human like us.” 
(Strathern 1971) 
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7 It is no more than a model since the symbolon rite is not in and of itself an exchange of 
gifts. 
8 It also completely leaves aside another form of gift-giving that is not a social practice 
(and therefore lies outside of my typology) but involves a philosophical decision: a view 
of being as a gift (which I call the gift from nobody); for instance, J. L Marion’s analyses 
in Being Given (Marion 2002) belong to this category. 
9 It can therefore be said that reciprocal ceremonial gift-giving confronts and resolves the 
prisoner’s dilemma (decision-making based on limited information or involving 
uncertainty regarding others) in a particularly elegant way. One bets on trust and obtains it 
through a reply guaranteed by the things given. 
10 According to Plato, “The state in which the law is above the rulers, and the rulers are 
the inferiors of the law, has salvation, and every blessing which the gods can confer.” 
[Laws, IV, 715d]. 
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